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A Critique of Light-Handed Regulation:




Network industries in the United States such as telecommunications,
electricity, and natural gas have traditionally involved private companies
subject to price regulation by state and federal government agencies.
Regulation has been justified by the perception that at least some aspect of
each industry is a natural monopoly, such as the local telephone network,
the high-voltage electricity transmission network, and the natural gas
pipeline system. Other countries lack a similar regulatory tradition because
foreign governments directly owned the companies that provided such
services. However, the recent trend of privatization has prompted the need
for other countries to establish regulatory systems.
The British government, for example, privatized the
telecommunications, electricity and natural gas industries in the 1980s.
Recognizing the need for a regulatory system to constrain the potential
monopoly position of privatized companies, the British government
reviewed the experience with regulation in the United States. The
government concluded that United States regulation had involved excessive
administrative costs and produced inefficient incentives for regulated
companies. The alternative of "light-handed" regulation was proposed,
where prices would be updated automatically on an annual basis by a
mathematical formula that accounted for inflation and for target
improvements in efficiency. It was hoped that this approach would avoid
costly regulatory proceedings and provide incentives for privatized
companies to reduce costs.
* The Brattle Group, Ltd. 8-12 Brook Street London WlY 2BY United Kingdom. The
authors would like to thank Tom Briggs for his valuable help. However, any mistakes
remain the responsibility of the authors.
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Although attractive in theory, the implementation of light-handed
regulation in the United Kingdom has faced several problems. First, light-
handed regulation has not worked as anticipated to avoid the need for
lengthy regulatory proceedings. Second, light-handed regulation has
unintentionally created inefficient incentives for regulated companies.
Third, light-handed regulation has not successfully constrained the
monopoly power of incumbents.
We illustrate the problems with light-handed regulation principally by
reference to the experience of British Gas. The British government
established the Office of Gas Regulation, known as Ofgas, to regulate
British Gas after its privatization. However, Ofgas was not able to set
reasonable prices without instigating lengthy proceedings before the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission that examined the costs of British
Gas. We analyze a particular dispute over British Gas prices that took over
four years to resolve. The desire to avoid "heavy-handed" regulation of
British Gas also created inefficient incentives for the pipeline to add new
customers. Light-handed regulation further left British Gas the scope to
abuse its monopoly position over existing customers.
We conclude from the British Gas experience that the United
Kingdom's privatization policy in the 1980s did not adequately anticipate
the complexities of regulating private companies with monopoly power.
The United States regulatory experience may have seemed quite
unattractive when compared to an optimistic vision of light-handed
regulation, but appears less so when compared to the difficulties
encountered by British regulation in practice. Other countries now
establishing regulatory systems will benefit from a careful comparison of
international experience, and would do well to avoid the extremes of either
heavy-handed or light-handed regulation.
IX. UNITED STATES REGULATORY EXPERIENCE
A distinguishing feature of traditional United States regulation is its
close examination of costs in formal regulatory proceedings known as "rate
cases." Prices are set at levels deemed sufficient to recover the reasonable
costs incurred in providing service. The regulated firm typically has an
obligation to compile detailed accounts of its expenses, which are
scrutinized closely for their reasonableness. The costs that are recognized
in connection with long-lived investments include depreciation, which is
typically based on the original accounting cost of an asset, and a rate of
return on the undepreciated balance. Before the regulator recognizes the
costs of an asset in the determination of prices, the company must establish
that the asset is being "used and useful" and that the costs of the investment
were prudently incurred. This form of regulation is sometimes called "rate
of return" regulation.
Once a rate case is completed, the resulting prices are fixed until either
consumers or the company petition for a new proceeding to re-examine
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costs. The legal and other costs of participating in a rate case naturally
reduce the desire to petition for a new one. The frequency of rate cases
therefore depends on the pace at which the company's underlying costs are
believed to change, and on the transaction costs of participating in such a
proceeding. In an environment characterized by high inflation, rate cases
can be expected to occur more frequently.
One of the perceived problems of United States regulation was the
high level of administrative costs involved. Decades of regulatory
experience led to the development of elaborate procedural rules for
conducting administrative proceedings. The proceedings tended to take a
lot of time and involve considerable legal costs. The regulated company
also faced a considerable administrative burden of compiling detailed
accounting information for all its activities. At times it appeared that
disproportionate effort was dedicated to examining relatively trivial
matters. Although the Food and Drug Administration did not conduct rate
cases, it provided some notorious examples of expensive and prolonged
administrative proceedings over issues that did not appear to merit the
effort. One was a series of proceedings that began in 1959 and did not end
until 1970 to determine whether it would "promote honesty and fair dealing
in the interest of consumers" to require that the label "peanut butter" be
limited to products with at least 90 percent peanuts as opposed to 87
percent.' Apparently, the first government witness "presented a survey of
cook books, patent applications, and.. .the historical composition of peanut
butter.. .On cross-examination, the witness was asked about his personal
tastes in peanut butter. . .[and] about cook book formulations of peanut
butter he had not referred to in his direct testimony."2 Similarly, the law
was criticized for requiring the agency to "hold hearings on questions such
as whether 'golden' should be a synonym for 'yellow' in canned corn, or
whether pear halves should weigh a minimum of three-fifths or four-fifths
of an ounce."3
Another problem was that close scrutiny of the regulated company's
activities did not ensure efficient outcomes. As the price of oil rose
dramatically in the 1970s, for example, many electric utilities planned to
construct nuclear power plants. The plants appeared justified under
forecasts of continued high oil prices and continued growth in demand. By
the time the plants were completed, however, it was apparent that many
were not efficient. Nevertheless, the formal planning studies that had been
undertaken before constructing these plants were, in many cases, sufficient
to establish the "prudence" of the investments. Even if the plants did not
operate at full capacity, partial operation was sufficient to meet the "used
and useful" standard. Many regulators therefore set rates sufficiently high
IR. Hamilton, "Rulemaking On A Record By The Food And Drug Administration", 50
TEx. LAW REv. 1132, 1144 (1972).2 Id.
3 Id. at. 1188.
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to recover depreciation and a rate of return on the investments in these
plants. The experience with nuclear power plants demonstrated that the
examination of prudence and the "used and useful" standard could not
ensure efficiency.
Close scrutiny of a regulated company may also facilitate "regulatory
capture," where the regulator's primary loyalty is to the regulated
companies rather than consumers. The concern is that intimate contact
between the regulator and the regulated company may breed a familiarity
that ultimately secures the regulator's loyalty. One study of United States
regulation noted that agencies, "rather like Shakespeare's seven ages of
man... went through a series of stages -- gestation, youth, maturity and
finally debility and decline," where the goals in the final stage were to
protect the status quo and the regulated companies rather than consumers.4
Others have cited early United States railroad regulation as a specific
example of regulatory capture.5
Finally, it became evident that rate of return regulation could actually
promote inefficiency. A seminal article by Averch and Johnson identified
possible incentives to engage in excessive capital investment.6 Their
intuition can be illustrated by imagining the trade-offs confronting a
regulated telephone company in the production of telephone sets. The
company can build a modest factory that produces cheap telephone sets
with limited useful lives, or it can build an extremely expensive factory to
produce telephone sets that last forever. It may well be that the modest
factory makes more economic sense, if the initial savings in building the
factory more than offset the subsequent costs of replacing telephones.
However, if the telephone company is subject to rate of return regulation, it
may have an inherent bias toward building the more expensive factory. If
recognized as prudent by the regulator, the more expensive factory will
provide more rewards to shareholders through depreciation and the allowed
rate of return. Averch and Johnson summarized their theory as follows:7
if the rate of return allowed by the regulatory agency is greater than the
cost of capital, but is less than the rate of return that would be enjoyed by the
firm, were it free to maximize profit without regulatory constraint, then the
firm will substitute capital for the other factor of production and operate at an
output where cost is not minimized.
4 Dennis Swann, The Retreat of the State: Deregulation and Privatization in the UK and
US 72 (1988) (citing M. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission
(1955)).
1 Id. (citing G. Kolko, Railroads and Regulation 1877-1916 (1965), and B.M. Mitnick,
The Political Economy of Regulation (1980), p. 179.
6 H. Averch, L. Johnson, "Behavior Of The Firm Under Regulatory Constraint",
American Economic Journal, (December 1962), p. 1053.
7Id.
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II. THE UK EXPERIMENT: LIGHT-HANDED REGULATION
The British government was conscious of the problems with United
States regulation when its privatization program prompted the need to
establish a new regulatory framework. Anticipating the privatization of
British Telecommunications, in October 1982 the British government
commissioned a study from the noted professor Stephen Littlechild.8 At
the outset, the Secretary of State "expressed a desire for regulation with a
light rein."9 The Littlechild Report examined the appropriate method for
regulating the telecommunications industry, and developed a proposal for
light-handed regulation as a superior alternative to traditional United States
regulatory practice.
The Littlechild Report found little inspiration in United States
regulatory experience: "[r]esearch on rate of return regulation in the USA
had shown that it resulted in waste of investment and a costly
bureaucracy."'" The detailed scrutiny of costs and regulated activities was
viewed as counterproductive: "In the USA regulators have been given
ample powers to extract and analyze information, and considerable
discretion in approving tariff structures and rates of return. The end-result
has not been a reduction in monopoly power-in general, quite the
opposite has happened. At the same time, investment has been distorted
and efficiency and innovation discouraged."" The Littlechild Report also
referred to the Averch-Johnson effect in the United States: "The evidence
of over-capitalisation in the US power industry is claimed to be strong.
One estimate is that actual production costs exceeded efficient production
costs by about 12 percent in 1962."12
The Littlechild Report exerted a strong influence on British
government policy, and has been called the "catalyst" for the development
of light-handed regulation in the United Kingdom. 3 Its dissatisfaction with
heavy-handed United States regulation became an important part of
regulatory philosophy in the United Kingdom: "the government was
anxious to avoid the perceived problems of U.S. rate-of-return regulation in
terms of cost inefficiency, regulatory burden, and vulnerability to
capture.'
' 4
The Littlechild Report proposed a relatively simple alternative to
lengthy regulatory proceedings. Average prices were to be set by a
mathematical formula involving "RPI minus X." A reasonable benchmark
I Stephen C. Littlechild, "Regulation of British Telecommunications' Profitability"
(February 1983), p. 3 [hereinafter Littlechild Report].
9 Littlechild Report, p. 39.
'oLittlechild Report, p. 3.
"Littlechild Report, p. 8.
12 Littlechild Report, p. 18.
'3 M. Armstrong, S. Cowan, and J. Vickers, Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and
British Experience (1994), p. 166.
1
41d. at p. 216.
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price cap would be selected as the starting point for the regulated company,
and would automatically be increased in each year to track inflation as
measured by the retail price index ("RPI"). At the same time, the
percentage increase in prices would be offset by a specified factor known
as "X" selected by reference to a target level of efficiency improvement for
the regulated company. The intention was to select an "X" factor that
would provide consumers some share of the benefits anticipated from
increased productivity. At the same time, investors would benefit if the
regulated company's productivity improvements exceeded X percent per
year.
The proposed system of RPI-X regulation was anticipated to have
several benefits. Among them was its administrative simplicity: "If the
RPI -- X per cent constraint is violated the [regulator] will need to ascertain
the reason for this and remedial action may be needed to be taken; but a
simple tariff reduction will suffice. The [regulator] does not have to make
any judgement or calculations with respect to capital, allocation of costs,
rates of return, future movements of costs and demand, desirable
performance etc."15
Another anticipated benefit lay in avoiding the Averch-Johnson effect.
Under RPI-X regulation, companies would maximize profits by saving on
capital expenditures. Embarking on large construction programs would no
longer be a strategy for securing higher rates. The regulated company also
stood to benefit by lowering costs by more than the X factor: "the
knowledge that a target has to be met each year may prove a spur to
efficiency. Any cost reductions exceeding the agreed target are kept by the
company. ' 6
The Littlechild Report proposed that the existing tariffs of British
Telecommunications be used as the starting point for RPI-X regulation.
Because the X factor would cause the existing tariff to decrease in real
terms over time, the RPI-X proposal was labelled "a local tariff reduction
scheme."' 7 The use of existing tariffs promised further to facilitate the
implementation of light-handed regulation, as the regulator would not have
to perform any independent analysis of reasonable tariff levels.
Following the Littlechild Report, the British government implemented
RPI-X regulation for British telecommunications. The same basic
approach was subsequently adopted for other industries as their "natural
monopolies" were privatized, including airports, parts of the electricity
industry, natural gas and water companies.'
" Littlechild Report, p. 36.
16 Id.
17 Id. atp. 34.
1 M. Armstrong, S. Cowan & J. Vickers, Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and
British Experience (1994), p. 165.
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IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH LIGHT-HANDED REGULATION
In practice, the approach taken by the British government has not
solved all the problems of traditional United States regulation, nor has it
proved as simple to administer as anticipated. British regulators have
found that reasonable prices cannot be determined without an inquiry into
the costs of the regulated company. British regulatory practice has had to
respond by becoming more "heavy-handed," performing similar cost
analyses to those traditionally performed by United States regulators.
Unfortunately, the regulated companies have the advantage of knowing
their costs far better than the regulator, and have systematically used their
advantage to the detriment of consumers. Light-handed regulation has also
created inefficient incentives and allowed regulated companies to abuse
their market power.
We first demonstrate why RPI-X regulation as originally proposed is
not sustainable without an analysis of costs. The mere selection of "X"
presumes some estimate of efficiency improvements that can be realized by
the regulated company, which requires an understanding of existing and
projected operating costs. The reasonableness of prices also depends
fundamentally on the level of capital expenditures needed to provide the
service. A company's existing tariff level can serve as a reasonable
starting point for the RPI-X formula only if it already provides sufficient
compensation for prospective capital expenditures. For example, changes
in electricity consumption can require significant investments in the
transmission network. There is no guarantee that past transmission tariffs,
even if increased for changes in the retail price index and allowing for
additional volumes of electricity, will be sufficient to compensate for the
necessary investment. To determine the parameters of the RPI-X formula
by reference to an examination of operating costs and capital costs can be
viewed as a step back towards heavy-handed United States regulation.
The requirement to consider capital costs was explicitly cited in a
critique of light-handed regulation as applied to the privatized water
companies. Economists John Vickers and George Yarrow warned of
inefficient underinvestment unless capital expenditures and rates of return
were explicitly considered in rate cases. Specifically:' 9
firms may deliberately underinvest since, by confronting regulators with
supply shortages and relatively poor service standards, they will be in a
stronger position to argue that higher prices are required to finance the desired
improvements. In contrast, if high expenditures to improve standards are
incurred at the outset, regulators will later treat these items as sunk costs and
firms would have to rely more heavily on arguments of fairness in supporting
their case for higher prices, which arguments may not always be persuasive to
public bodies facing consumer pressures for lower prices. To offset these
19J. Vickers & G. Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis (1988), pp. 410-1
(emphasis added in last sentence).
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biases, therefore, we can see no alternative to the explicit introduction of rate-
of-return criteria in regulatory decisions...
RPI-X regulation in the United Kingdom has since evolved into a cost
analysis quite similar to United States regulatory practice. Regulators
assess the value of existing investment that should be recognized in the
determination of prices. They also estimate a reasonable rate of return on
this investment, and project its depreciation over the "control period,"
which refers to the number of years before the question of reasonable
prices will be revisited. Projections of operating costs and capital
expenditures for the control period are also involved. Prices are then set at
levels which, when adjusted over the control period by RPI-X and
accounting for projected changes in volumes, will compensate for
operating costs and a reasonable rate of return on investment. Examples of
this logic can be found in the recent "rate cases" for the National Grid
Company2° and British Gas."
RPI-X regulation supplemented by an analysis of operating and
capital costs, does not differ greatly from traditional United States rate of
return regulation. RPI-X regulation retains an advantage in considering
projected inflation rates over time. Recall that United States regulation
typically leaves rates fixed until one party or another is sufficiently
concerned to invoke a new rate case. At times of high inflation, rate cases
are more frequent. Applying an RPI-X formula could well have postponed
some rate cases in the United States during the late 1970s when inflation
was quite high. However, the advantage of the RPI-X formula is far less
significant in the current environment of low inflation.
Another key difference is that the British regulatory system determines
compensation in advance for investments that are projected throughout the
control period. Under traditional United States regulation, an investment
must be complete and operational before its costs are recognized in a rate
case. Although the United States approach became associated with the
Averch-Johnson effect, the approach under RPI-X regulation has its own
problems. Regulated companies have an information advantage over the
regulator, and have an incentive to distort the amount of capital
expenditures that will be required over the control period. Once the
2 0 The Office of Electricity Regulation ("Offer"), The Transmission Price Control Review
of The National Grid Company - Proposals (1996), p. 3 ("The range of possible price
controls put forward in the fourth consultation paper reflected a considered evaluation of
NGC's past and prospective operating costs, capital expenditure, cost of capital and asset
valuation").
21 Monopolies and Mergers Commission, BG plc, A Report Under the Gas Act 1986 on
the Restriction of Prices for Gas Transportation and Storage Services (May
1997)(hereinafter 1997 MMC), p. 31 ("The appropriate level of revenues reflects judgments
on a number of key financial issues: first, what is the appropriate cost of capital.. .secondly,
what is the financial base to which that cost of capital should be applied; and thirdly, how
should depreciation be treated... We also have to consider the appropriate level of capital
investment... The appropriate level of revenue will also depend on the assumed level of
operating costs.").
486
A Critique of Light-Handed Regulation
19:479 (1999)
regulator is persuaded of a company's projections and uses them to set
prices, the company then has a financial incentive to abandon the initial
plans and simply collect compensation for investments never undertaken.
Regulated companies in the United Kingdom have consistently abused
their information advantage by spending less than projected by regulators.
The phenomenon has become known as the "underspend." For example,
the National Grid Company ("NGC") had persuaded the regulator that the
electricity transmission network required £1.6 billion in capital
expenditures between the years 1993 and 1996.' This forecast was
incorporated into the RPI-X formula. Actual expenditures for the same
period were only £900 million or roughly 45 percent less than forecast.'
Over three years consumers of electricity effectively paid to finance £700
million in investments that were never made. The "underspend" for British
Gas has also been dramatic. From 1994 to 1996, British Gas prices had
presumed capital expenditures of £3.1 billion, while British Gas actually
spent only £2.1 billion.24
Unfortunately, there is no easy remedy to the "underspend." After the
underspend has been detected, the company has an incentive to claim that
the initial forecasts were reasonable, and that unforeseen management
efficiency was responsible for the underspend: "NGC says that, while
some of this reduction in capital expenditure has been due to factors
outside its control and in particular to the slowdown in generation
development, a large part of it represents capital efficiencies by
management initiatives on NGC's part."'  The implication is that
management should be allowed to retain the benefits of the underspend as a
reward for efficiency, much as the company is allowed to retain the
difference between its actual productivity gains and the target implied by
"X." If the regulated company were not allowed to retain the financial
benefits of the underspend, it would lose its efficiency incentives and the
danger of the Averch-Johnson effect could resurface.26
The light-handed approach of regulators has exaggerated the problems
arising from incomplete information. For example, in 1996 the Office of
I The Office of Electricity Regulation ("Offer"), The Transmission Price Control Review
of The National Grid Company- Fourth Consultation (1996), p. 23.
2 Id.
24 1997 MMC, p. 106 (comparing British Gas forecasts to actual expenditures) and Ofgas,
"Price Controls on Gas Transportation and Storage" (1994), p. 6 (confirming that regulated
prices were based on British Gas forecasts: "The Director has assessed the value of 'X' as
that required, given reasonable assumptions, to permit profits to grow in real terms sufficient
to remunerate capital and replacement expenditure as currently forecast by BG") (emphasis
added).
I The Office of Electricity Regulation, The Transmission Price Control Review of The
National Grid Company-Fourth Consultation (1996), p. 23.
26Monopolies and Mergers Commission, BAA plc, A Report on the Economic
Regulation of the London Airports Companies (Heathrow Airport Ltd., Gatwick Airport Ltd.
and Stansted Airport Ltd.) (1996), p. 38.
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Electricity Regulation ("Offer") sought to determine reasonable prices for
NGC in part by reference to the market value of its shares at privatization.
However, NGC's shares were supported in part by a subsidiary named
Energis that operated a telecommunications business. Offer determined
that the value of Energis should be subtracted from the market value of
NGC's shares to derive a reasonable estimate for the transmission
business." A debate emerged over the value of Energis, which was
conducted with limited information and involved private interviews
between Offer and investment advisors.28 In retrospect, Offer reached an
erroneous conclusion that, as shown below, seriously overstated the prices
that consumers pay for electricity transmission.
Offer cited as one indicator of value the total investment of £400
million that NGC had incurred in Energis to date. It was pointed out that
£400 million understated the total investment by NGC, since NGC's
transmission rights-of-way were used by Energis to lay fiber-optic cables.29
The value of the rights of way should have been included in the measure of
total investment. However, no data were made available allowing an
evaluation. It was also pointed out to Offer that NGC had rejected an offer
by AT&T to purchase one third of Energis for £200 million.3" AT&T's
offer suggested that Energis was worth more than £600 million.
Presumably, NGC only rejected the offer after performing a serious
valuation that yielded a higher figure. However, no documents associated
with NGC's valuation were disclosed in the regulatory process. Nor did
Offer perform an in-depth analysis of its own. Offer concluded that a
reasonable value for Energis was only £250 million, cited as the mid-point
of a range from £200 to £300 million derived from unnamed analysts.3'
Roughly one year after Offer's decision, a portion of Energis was
floated on the stock market as a separate stock. The price of the shares
implied a total market value for the company of £850 million.32 The
implication was that Offer's light-handed approach to assessing the value
of Energis had led consumers to overpay for electricity transmission by
£600 million. An article in the Financial Times discussed the episode and
concluded that responsibility for the mistake lay with an information
asymmetry exacerbated by the British light-handed approach to
regulation:
33
27 Offer, The Transmission Price Control Review of The National Grid Company -
Proposals (1996), p. 16.281 d. at p. 18 ("I asked my merchant bank advisers for their view").
29Id. atp. 17.
30 Id. atp. 18.
31 Id.
32 "Energis Shares Rise 2p," The Financial Times (Dec. 10, 1997) ("Energis, the
telecommunications subsidiary of National Grid, yesterday made a satisfactory if
unspectacular market debut.. .the price values the company at about Pounds 850m").
33 G. Palast, "Regulators Could Learn from Texas Chicken Chef," The Financial Times
(Mar. 26, 1998).
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[Offer] was at a distinct disadvantage in facing down the utility chiefs.
[It] had no access to the management's own projections and bankers'
opinions which, undoubtedly, valued Energis closer to reality. In the US,
such crucial documents would have been available for review. . . To
British eyes, the US system is a shock. One [Member of Parliament]
shuddered at the concept of the US system. "It's too litigious, too
complex, too many lawyers." And it is true. US free-for-all public hearings
are loud, messy, contentious and highly politicized -- in a word,
democratic.
V. THE EXPERIENCE OF BRITISH GAS
The experience of British Gas has revealed several interesting
problems with light-handed regulation. In addition to the problem with the
"underspend" cited above, regulation has been greatly complicated by the
lack of any tradition in the use of accounting costs to set prices. Regulators
realized that the parameters of the RPI-X formula should be set by
reference to cost projections and a measure of existing investment, but they
became immersed in an intricate debate over the level of existing
investment that should be recognized in prices, known as the "regulatory
asset base." Furthermore, light-handed regulation of British Gas has given
rise to inefficient incentives. British Gas actually has a financial incentive
to expand throughput of the system even if it involves the addition of
customers whose costs exceed the revenues they pay. We conclude that the
regulation of British Gas has not sufficiently constrained the abuse of
market power in the transportation of natural gas.
A. The Regulatory Asset Base
By 1993, RPI-X regulation of British Gas was supplemented by an
analysis of the returns to existing investment. Unfortunately, no consistent
measure of investment had ever been used to determine prices for British
Gas under previous government ownership or since privatization. British
Gas had a set of accounts that purported to measure the value of its assets
under "Current Cost Accounting" ("CCA"), but these accounts were
inconsistent with the history of prices. British Gas argued that the CCA
value of its assets was the relevant economic benchmark for establishing
prices, because it reflected the cost of replacing the existing pipeline
infrastructure. However, "the rate of return had been kept below a full
economic level prior to privatization,"34 and as a result the shares in British
Gas at privatization "were issued at a price that valued the company at a
substantial discount to the balance sheet replacement cost (CCA
"I Monopolies & Mergers Commission, BG plc: A Report under the Gas Act 1986 on the
Restriction of Prices for Gas Transportation and Storage Services (May 1997), p. 42
[hereinafter MMC 97].
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valuation)."35 The discount was roughly 60 percent, as investors "paid only
40p for each £1 of current cost net assets underlying their shares."36 A
dilemma was therefore created: if the CCA value of existing investment
was accepted in the determination of prices, then shareholders would
expect a windfall over the price they actually paid for British Gas shares at
privatization.
The Monopolies & Mergers Commission ("MMC") confronted the
issue of measuring the regulatory asset base of British Gas. Using the full
CCA value of assets would have implied a present value of £17.5 billion in
association with 1991 investment. Using the market value of British Gas
shares as of 1991 would have yielded a present value of only £10.5
billion. 7 The magnitude of the dispute was therefore £7 billion.
The MMC struck an awkward compromise between the two positions.
Cosmetically the MMC accepted the CCA value of assets of £17.5 billion,
but adjusted the allowed rate of return by the "Market to Asset Ratio,"
("MAR") which referred to the quotient of £10.5 billion over £17.5 billion,
or 60 percent. By cutting the rate of return, the MMC appeared to accept
the view that £10.5 billion was the relevant figure.38  The MMC
explained:
3 9
The lower ROR [rate of return] on existing assets is justified by the
difference between the current cost value of BG's net assets and the (lower)
market value of its equity, measured by the MAR. Because the assets were
acquired at a discount, from the shareholders' standpoint, and still stand at
a discount in the market, allowing a full ROR (equal to the market cost of
capital) would lead to a substantial windfall gain to BG's shareholders, at
the expense of its customers.
Oddly, the MMC failed to follow a similar approach with respect to
depreciation. Shareholders are compensated for their investment under
traditional regulation by a combination of depreciation and a rate of return
on the undepreciated balance of their investment. Although the MMC
effectively accepted the £10.5 billion figure to calculate the rate of return,
11 Monopolies & Mergers Commission, British Gas plc: Reports Under the Gas Act 1986
on the Conveyance and Storage of Gas and the Fixing of Tariffs for the supply of Gas by
British Gas plc (1993), Vol. II, p. 194 [hereinafter MMC 93].
36 Geoffrey Whittington, "Current Cost Accounting: Its Role in Regulated Utilities,"
Fiscal Studies (1994) Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 91.
11 Unfortunately, the price paid by investors for British Gas at privatization was
disregarded in favor of an alternative analysis that focused upon the market value of British
Gas shares as of 1991. While shareholders had only paid "40p for each £1" of CCA assets
at privatization, as indicated above, by 1991 the market value of British Gas shares had risen
to 60 percent of the CCA value. By focusing on the market value of shares as of 1991, the
MMC effectively granting shareholders a windfall for the run-up in share prices between the
1986 privatization and 1991. Id.
3' Mathematically, if one takes £17.5, multiplies it by the appropriate rate of return and
by £10.5/£17.5, then the £17.5 "drops out" and the result is simply £10.5 times the rate of
return.
319MMC 93, Vol. II, p. 202.
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it accepted £17.5 billion for calculating the annual depreciation allowance.
The MMC acknowledged that consistency would require a similar
adjustment to depreciation as to the rate of return, but decided that "arcane
adjustments of this type may make the calculations unduly complicated and
give a spurious aura of precision to what are essentially subjective
,,41estimates.
The proceedings before the MMC had not involved any public
scrutiny or cross-examination of the argument that multiplying CCA
depreciation by 60 percent would be either "arcane" or excessively
complicated mathematically. We estimated that the MMC's approach
implied a present value of £14.3 billion in association with 1991 assets. 41
The failure to adjust CCA depreciation by the MAR therefore offered a
windfall of roughly £3.8 billion over the 1991 market value of the assets.
We suspect that consumers would not have considered the adjustment
arcane, would consider £3.8 billion beyond the zone of "spurious"
precision, and would have gladly aided the regulator with the necessary
mathematical calculations.
In 1997 the MMC was again confronted with the issue of determining
reasonable prices for British Gas, and arguments resurfaced over the CCA
value of assets as opposed to the prices that shareholders had paid at
privatization.42 The inconsistent treatment of the rate of return and
depreciation was also questioned. The MMC diplomatically conceded a
blunder: "The [previous] MMC report was produced at a relatively early
stage in the development of utility regulatory thinking in the UK... to allow
full [CCA] depreciation in revenues during the period under review may be
expected to result in prices higher than necessary to finance the carrying on
of Transco's activities, to the detriment of consumers of gas."43
By the time of the 1997 MMC decision, however, Transco had
enjoyed several years of full CCA depreciation. A question arose on the
proper method of dealing with Transco's excessive depreciation. We
stressed that the current rate base should be measured by the 1991 market
value of assets, inflated for subsequent capital expenditures, and reduced
by the excess of total target revenues in each year over the sum of
operating costs and the appropriate rate of return.' In effect, the regulatory
asset base, measured correctly in 1991, should be depreciated by the total
capital charges above and beyond an appropriate return that Transco had
been allowed to collect by the regulatory formula since 1993. With the
regulatory asset base, updated correctly to 1997, no prospective adjustment
4 0 Id.
41 p. Carpenter, C. Lapuerta and T. Briggs, Submission of Enron Capital & Trade
Resources, Ltd To the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (November 1996), Appendix 4,
Figure 2 [hereinafter Submission to MMC].
4
1 MMC 97, pp. 111-115.
4 Id. at pp. 41, 44.
44 Submission to MMC, p. 30.
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to the rate of return would be necessary. However, prospective
depreciation would be designed to erode gradually the resulting regulatory
asset base over the remaining useful life of the underlying assets. We
demonstrated that our proposal would allow investors to receive a present
value equal to the £10.5 billion market value of the assets in 1991." 5
Ofgas advanced a more modest proposal before the MMC.46 To avoid
even unfounded accusations of "retroactive ratemaking" by British Gas,
Ofgas proposed that the actual depreciation charges received by British Gas
between 1994 and 1997 be ignored entirely. Instead, Ofgas suggested that
a new regulatory asset base be measured by simply taking the 1997 CCA
value and multiplying by 60 percent. 7 Prospectively, depreciation would
be calculated to recover the resulting regulatory asset base, rather than the
full CCA value. We demonstrated that this approach effectively allowed
investors to expect a present value of £12.1 billion for 1991 assets.4 8
Nevertheless, the proposal submitted by Ofgas appeared quite stark in
comparison to the proposal by British Gas, which involved continued use
of full CCA depreciation.
The MMC rejected the arguments by British Gas and adopted a
position almost identical to the Ofgas proposal.49  Although on a
prospective basis the resulting methodology involved a consistent
treatment of depreciation and the regulatory asset base, shareholders were
allowed to preserve a large windfall relative to the 1991 market value of
their assets. The outcome can be viewed as an exercise of monopoly
power. The windfall to shareholders was not made possible by the
efficiency of British Gas, but simply by dint of a regulatory process that
could pick among a variety of feasible price levels in the absence of any
competing pipeline system.
The debate over the regulatory asset base of British Gas and
depreciation can be attributed to the initial simplistic vision of light-handed
regulation. The British government should have anticipated that even RPI-
X regulation must be informed by reference to a measure of existing
investment, an appropriate rate of return and depreciation. A realistic
assessment of prospective regulation would have enabled the establishment
of consistent guidelines prior to privatization. The choice of a higher or
lower regulatory asset base would still have affected consumer prices, but
at least the government would have received a flotation value consistent
with the subsequent regulated revenues of British Gas, and shareholders
would not have retained a windfall. As it stands, the government received
45 Id. at Appendix 4, Figure 2.
46 Ofgas, 1997 Price Control Review British Gas' Transportation and Storage, The
Director General's final proposals (August 1996).
4 1 Id. at pp. vii-viii.
48 MMC Submission, Appendix 4, Figure 249MMC 97, pp. 40-44.
A Critique of Light-Handed Regulation
19:479 (1999)
a serious discount for British Gas and high prices under light-handed
regulation have enabled shareholders to receive excessive returns.
B. The Short-Haul Commodity Tariff
In February 1997 Transco, the pipeline subsidiary of British Gas,
proposed a new tariff that represented a significant discount for customers
located near the British coast-line, where offshore pipelines from North Sea
gas reserves connected to the British Gas pipeline system." The tariff was
intended to deter these customers from constructing their own short-
distance pipelines to connect directly to the European Interconnector, a
new independent pipeline that connected the United Kingdom with
continental Europe."1 In a document that attempted to persuade customers
to accept the new tariff, Transco unwittingly showed that the feared bypass
of its system would actually benefit other system users. 2 Transco
specifically showed that prices to other system users would increase if the
new tariff had its intended effect of avoiding bypass.53 Unfortunately,
Ofgas nevertheless approved the tariff with minimum discussion. 4
Transco had not reviewed the results of its analysis in sufficient detail.
The apparently odd results reflected an underlying weakness in the
structure of Transco regulation. Specifically, Transco's RPI-X price cap
failed to constrain the prices for different customers. Rather, the price cap
was specified simply as a constraint on the total revenues in each year
divided by the total volumes. Put differently, Transco faced no specific
price limit on any one customer as long as the average price across all
customers fell below a certain amount. The term "price cap" could indeed
be viewed as a misnomer for what was actually a revenue cap. To comply
with regulations, it did not matter whether the cap was satisfied by
charging all customers the same price, or by charging some customers a
price significantly above the average and others a price significantly below.
The perverse impact of the proposed short-haul commodity tariff derived
from Transco's practice of charging some users a significantly lower price
than others.
1o Transco, Pricing consultation Paper PC9, Optional NTS Commodity Tariff, February
1997 [hereinafter PC9].
11 Transco PC9, p. 1.
12 Transco, Pricing Consultation Paper PC9A: Optional Commodity Tariff (Nov. 1997)
[hereinafter Transco PC9A], p. 9. This contradicted other statements that Interconnector
bypass would prompt increases in tariffs "to all shippers using Transco's pipeline" (Transco,
Transportation Ten-Year Statement: 1997, p. 67) and "future prices to existing users would
be higher if existing or future potential loads abandon the Transco system" (Transco PC9A,
p. 5)..
53Transco PC9A, at p. 9.
s Letter from Transco re: "NTS Optional Commodity Tariff' (Jan. 9, 1998).
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Tablel: Prices to Other System Users
Case 1: Bypass Occurs
1996 1997
[1] MillionTherms SeeNote 5,381 5,512
[2] Percent Increase r1]€r[1]. - 1 2.43%
[3] 50% of Increase [21 x 0.5 1.22%
t4l RPI-X MMC 97 p.178 1.00%
[5l Allowed Increase (Outturn) (1+[2])(1+r3])-1 2.23%
[6l 1997 Price See Note 1.85
[7] Annual Revenues (Outturm) F1] x F6] /100 £102.1
[8L Other Prices (Outturn) See Note 1.856
19L Previous Revenues MMC 97, p.1 7 8  £107.9
[101 Difference in Revenues [7]1 - 9] (£5.8)
Transco Reported Figures PC9A,_p.9
11l Change in Actual Income PC9A, p.9 (£5.0)
r121 Change in Regulatory Income PC9A, p.9 (£6.0)
r13] Impact on Charges for Other Users PC9A, p.9 (£1.0)
Notes
[1]: MMC 97, p.7 8 . 1997 is MMC Forecast less volumes subject to
optional tariff.
[6]: ([8]., x [1]t,/100) x (l+[5])/([1]tI 100)
[8]: Transco Case 1 analysis: Transco PC9A, p.9.
At our request, Transco supplied the detailed assumptions underlying
its calculations. 5 In "Case 1" where Transco explored potential bypass, it
had assumed a loss in volume of 618 million therms and decreased
revenues of £5.23 million per year, implying that the relevant customers
were currently being charged an average of 0.85 pence per therm. This was
less than half the average price cap of 1.76 pence per therm. By charging
low prices to some customers, Transco could charge higher prices to other
system users without exceeding the average cap for the year. Charging the
potential bypass customers 0.85 pence per therm actually allowed Transco
to collect 1.86 pence per therm from the remaining volumes. The weighted
average of these different prices across their respective volumes satisfied
precisely the average 1.76 pence per therm price cap.s6
Table 1 presents the underlying mechanics of Transco's own "Case 1"
bypass analysis. The average cap for all users was anticipated to increase
slightly if bypass occurred, as the MMC had recently specified a regulatory
formula that was contingent upon actual volumes. However, other system
s Transco, "Detailed Data Underlying Table 1 in PC9A", 3 December 1997.
56 Letter to Ofgas from T. Briggs, P. Carpenter and C. Lapuerta, re: "Optional NTS
Commodity Tariff-Further Consultation" (Dec. 5, 1997).
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users would have welcomed the bypass. Removal of the bypass customers
would simultaneously prevent Transco from charging other system users
amounts that exceeded the cap on average. The assumed bypass in Table 1
was anticipated to raise the average cap from 1.76 to 1.85 pence per therm,
but other system users would have benefited by witnessing a reduction in
their average price from the 1.86 pence per therm. that they were currently
paying to 1.85. These prices were consistent with the summary figures
quoted publicly by Transco, which suggested that the impact on other users
would be a net decrease in charges of £1 million per year.57
Table 2: Comparison of Rates
Optional Other Average
Commodity System Large User
Tariff Customers Users Price Cap
1997 Rates 0.85 1.86 1.76
Case 1: Bypass N/A 1.85 1.85
Case 2: No Bypass 0.49 2.15 1.48
A similar problem explained the results of Transco's "Case 2," which
assumed that the new tariff could stem bypass and attract additional
volumes to the system. Even though the additional volumes were
anticipated to reduce the average cap from 1.76 to 1.48 pence per therm,
other system users would suffer. The average pence per therm for
customers receiving the new tariff would fall from 0.85 pence per therm to
0.49 pence per therm, allowing Transco to raise the rates on other large
users from 1.86 to 2.15 pence per therm while still complying with the new
lower cap. Again, these prices were consistent with the summary figures
quoted by Transco, which showed other system users paying £16 million
more per year. 8 Table 2 summarizes the rates to different classes of
customers under the different scenarios analyzed by Transco.
British Gas's ability to charge different rates to different customers
and still meet the average price cap creates inefficient incentives to
encourage new volumes. British Gas can still make money even if the rates
offered to potential new customers bear no relationship to the underlying
costs of serving them. For example, it would clearly be inefficient for
57Transco, Table 1: Potential Impact of Offering Optional NTS Tariff, pricing
Consultation Paper PC9A: Optional Community Tariff, Feb. 1997, at 9.
58 Id.
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British Gas to attract new volumes by offering to transport gas for free.59
Efficiency requires that new customers be charged at least the marginal
costs that they impose on the system. However, British Gas can find it
attractive to offer new customers a free gas transportation service. The
volumes added to the system will allow British Gas to raise the rates on
other customers and still satisfy the aggregate cap for the year. It is the
average cap and its relationship to incremental volumes that ultimately
determines the incentives of British Gas, not the specific revenues collected
from new customers.
Similar inefficient incentives do not arise under United States
regulation. Pipelines are free to offer discounts to avoid the potential loss
of customers, but the discount to any one set of customers does not allow
the pipeline to raise the rates on others. Pipelines therefore do not find it
lucrative to offer discounts unless the incremental revenues from potential
bypass customers more than offset the incremental costs of keeping them
on the system. The pipeline is allowed to keep the incremental profit
associated with the discounts until the next rate case. The practice of
discounting is then acknowledged formally in the determination of rates,
and other customers are allowed to benefit from the incremental profits
from discounting.60  The fundamental problem with "light-handed
regulation" is its failure to constrain British Gas' discretion over prices
within the scope of the broad regulatory formula.
VI. CONCLUSION
Light-handed regulation initially promised to avoid the problems
associated with traditional United States regulation. Proponents in the
United Kingdom anticipated administrative simplicity and efficient
incentives for privatized utilities. The reality has been more complex.
Regulators have had to confront issues related to the measurement of
assets, depreciation, rates of return, and cost projections. Had these issues
been anticipated prior to privatization, more satisfactory solutions could
have been found. Furthermore, light-handed regulation has exacerbated the
information disadvantage of regulators, which has been exploited
successfully by regulated companies. Finally, light-handed regulation has
failed to avoid inefficient incentives. Although UK regulators were
59 In some cases, a free gas service might make economic sense for volumes in strategic
locations that help relieve system congestion. However, we assume in this example no
problems with congestion.
60 The FERC allows the "Revenue Crediting" and "Discounted Billing Determinants"
approaches to account for discounting. Under revenue crediting, the incremental costs of
the discounted volumes are included in the pipeline's total revenue requirement, but the
associated revenues are also "credited" against the revenue requirement. The net effect is
for other rate payers to enjoy the incremental profit from discounting. The discounted
billing determinants method accomplishes a similar result by including a fraction of the
discounted volumes in the calculation of rates, corresponding to the fraction of the total
regulated price that they pay.
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justified in their attempt to avoid the pitfalls of US-style regulation, it is
evident from their experience with light-handed regulation that the
examination of certain factors can not be avoided when determining the
appropriate rates offered by regulated companies.

